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How Competitive are Female Professionals? A Tale of Identity Conflict 
Abstract 
We develop and test experimentally the argument that gender/family and/or professional 
identities, activated through psychological priming, may influence preference for competition. 
We focus on female professionals for whom these identities may conflict and male professionals 
for whom they may be reinforcing. We primed MBA-student participants by administering 
questionnaires that concerned either gender/family or professional issues. Subsequently, 
participants undertook a real-effort task and chose between piece-rate and competitive-
tournament compensation. Identity priming, moderated by gender, significantly affected 
preference for competitive pay. This relationship was partially mediated by beliefs about one‟s 
performance ranking. The implications of our results are profound. The decision to avoid 
competition made by many female professionals may be driven not by lack of ability, but rather 
by the increased salience of gender/family identity, influenced by marriage and motherhood over 
time. Indeed, activation of internalized identities might not only drive the experimental results, 
but also have strong implications for career choices and job performance of women, thus 
contributing to the observed gender and motherhood wage gaps. 
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Despite continuous improvements over the last few decades, women are still earning less 
than men in the United States and in many other countries (Blau and Kahn, 2000; 2006 for the 
US; Drolet, 2001 for Canada; Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2005 present a meta-analysis 
of 263 wage-gap studies for many different countries).  This is true not only for women in 
general, but also for women who have graduated from top MBA programs, presumably with the 
aim of pursuing ambitious managerial/professional careers (Babcock and Laschever, 2003; 
Bertrand, Goldin and Katz, 2010; Carter and Silva, 2010). Moreover, female executives and MBA 
graduates occupy fewer seats in corporate boardrooms and are under-represented in many high-
profile jobs compared to men (Bertrand and Hallock, 2001; Carter and Silva, 2010; Pfeffer, 
2010).  
An extensive literature spanning economics, management, sociology and psychology 
attempts to explain these gender-based disparities in pay and promotion (e.g., Polachek 1981; 
Wennerås and Wold, 1997; Goldin and Rouse, 2000; Black and Strahan, 2001; Babcock and 
Laschever, 2003; Bertrand, Goldin and Katz, 2010; Carter and Silva, 2010; Pfeffer, 2010). In this 
study, we build on two recent strands of this literature. One of these strands uses laboratory 
experiments to demonstrate that male students choose to participate in highly competitive high-
stakes tournaments more frequently than female students in both the United States (Niederle and 
Vesterlund, 2007) and France (Datta Gupta, Poulsen, and Villeval, 2011). Moreover, Gneezy, 
Leonard, and List (2009) show that while males choose a competitive tournament more often 
than females among the patriarchal Maasai of Tanzania, females are more inclined than males to 
compete among the matrilineal Khasi of India. These contrasting behaviors highlight the 
importance of nurture and suggest that societal norms such as culture-specific gender roles and 
stereotypes may be important factors in explaining the differing attitudes of males and females 
toward competition. 
According to social role theory (Eagly and Karau, 2002), gender stereotypes originate 
from the social roles that men and women have traditionally occupied in a society. Stereotypes 
are learned early in life, become part of one‟s cultural understanding, and are internalized as 
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implicit beliefs and endorsed values. People extend such stereotypes to develop implicit self-
concepts, which are evidenced by automatic associations between the self and stereotypical 
personality traits, abilities and roles (e.g. Devos, Blanco, and Dunn, 2008). Such stereotypes are 
likely closely related to the differing preferences for competitive tournaments demonstrated by 
men and women in the lab. 
The other important strand of the literature focuses on the contrasting effects of marriage, 
motherhood and fatherhood on male and female pay and career advancement. Weichselbaumer 
and Winter-Ebmer (2005) demonstrate in their meta-analysis of 263 wage-gap studies that the 
male-female differential is significantly lower for single than for married employees across many 
countries and regions. An example of such a study is Drolet (2001), which shows that in Canada 
the observed ratio of female to male wages is 0.96 for single, never-married persons, but 0.77 for 
those who are married. Parenthood is particularly important in this regard. Indeed, a substantial 
motherhood wage penalty has been documented for the United States (e.g., Waldfogel, 1997; 
1998a; 1998b; Lundberg and Rose, 2000; Budig and England, 2001; Anderson, Binder, and 
Krause, 2002; 2003; Edwards, 2005) and many other countries (Joshi, Paci and Waldfogel, 1999; 
Todd, 2001; Phipps, Burton, and Latheridge, 2001; Harkness and Waldfogel, 2003; Kunze and 
Ejrnaes, 2004; Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel, 2007a; 2007b;Molina and Montuenga, 2009). In 
contrast, a significant fatherhood wage premium has also been observed (e.g., Lundberg and 
Rose, 2000; 2002; Glauber, 2008; Hodges and Budig, 2010). Moreover, Glass (2004) and Budig 
(2010) argue that the gender gap among employees with similar experience, education, training 
and jobs is actually a parenthood gap caused by the combination of a motherhood penalty and a 
fatherhood premium. Caranci and Gauthier (2010) make the same argument for Canada. 
What are the reasons for such a parenthood gap? Budig and England (2001) show that 
about one third of the motherhood penalty is explained by differences in job experience between 
mothers and women without children. They attribute the remaining two thirds to a combination 
of productivity differences and discrimination. A large number of experimental and 
questionnaire-based studies point to discrimination as an important factor (see Benard, Paik, and 
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Correll, 2008 for an excellent review of this literature). For example, Correll, Benard, and Paik 
(2007) present evidence that student evaluators and real employers both discriminate against 
mothers relative to females without children. In particular, student evaluators, when asked to 
compare two fictitious job applicants with otherwise equal qualifications, rated the mothers as 
significantly less competent and less committed to paid work than the females without children. 
They also recommended significantly lower salaries for the mothers. In contrast, fathers were 
considered significantly more committed to work, and raters recommended a significantly higher 
salary for them than for males without children. Real employers called back job applicants who 
were mothers significantly less often than females who were not parents. This was not true for 
males.  
A number of different models have been used to explain such discrimination (Benard, 
Paik, and Correll, 2008). They have in common the idea that people, including those responsible 
for hiring and salary decisions, have conflicting notions regarding the characteristics of a good 
mother versus those of a good employee (e.g., Blair-Loy, 2003). According to this view, a good 
mother is required to be warm, caring, and committed first to her family, implying less 
commitment to her job. In contrast, a good employee must be devoted, competent and committed 
to work. Using questionnaire-based experimental data, Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick (2004) argue that 
when female employees become mothers, others perceive them as warmer but less competent. 
Males however do not face this trade-off when becoming fathers, gaining perceived warmth, 
while retaining perceived competence.  
In this paper, we argue that such conflicting ideals regarding work and family life for 
females may affect not only the decisions of potential employers, but also the behavior of female 
employees themselves. If motherhood blunts a woman‟s competitive edge, her behavior not only 
in the family but also in the workplace may be affected. If so, the effects on both her productivity 
and her demonstrated ambition may be such as to reinforce the very discrimination that such 
women receive. We focus on women who have chosen to pursue a highly competitive 
managerial career. Our argument is that such women experience conflicting identities: a 
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professional identity that is highly competitive, competent and ambitious and a gender/family 
identity that is warm, supportive and caring. We demonstrate that when activated by subtle 
psychological priming, each of these identities can have a significant impact on whether such 
women will choose to participate in a competitive tournament with high-powered financial 
incentives. In contrast, for otherwise similar males, we show that identical priming has 
significantly different effects. Females primed with the gender/family identity are significantly 
less competitive than those primed with the professional identity, while males primed with the 
gender/family identity are not. In some instances, males primed with the gender/family identity 
are in fact significantly more competitive than those primed with the professional identity.  
Although the effects of such priming are short-term in nature, these results suggest that 
life-cycle events such as marriage, pregnancy, and parenthood might have very substantial and 
long-lasting effects on the activation of family identities with their consequent effects on 
attitudes toward competition. Thus, the decision to avoid or minimize competition made by 
many women in professional careers may be driven not by lack of ability but rather by the 
increased salience of the gender/family identity, based on stereotypical beliefs and attitudes, over 
time. 
 
EXPERIMENTS ON GENDER AND PREFERENCE FOR COMPETITION 
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) (henceforth NV) examined whether males and females 
differ in the type of compensation scheme they prefer, while holding the task characteristics 
constant. Since our experimental design shares some common features with the NV study, we 
describe it in some detail. NV employed a real-effort task, involving the addition of as many sets 
of five two-digit numbers as possible in a five-minute time interval. Males and females showed 
no significant differences in performance, whether working under an imposed piece-rate or under 
an imposed tournament compensation scheme. Although participants received feedback on their 
absolute performance, they received no feedback about their performance relative to the other 
members of their group. All groups consisted of two men and two women. After the two 
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imposed rounds, the participants were given a choice of compensation scheme for the same task. 
The results are striking. Despite the similar performance, 73% of males chose to enter the 
tournament, while only 35% of women chose to do so. NV find that this gender gap in 
tournament entry was driven both by greater male overconfidence relative to females and by 
different preferences for competition associated with each gender. In contrast, the experiment 
provides negligible evidence for risk and feedback aversion having an impact on participants‟ 
decisions.  
In a related study, Gneezy and Rustichini (2006) compared self-selection of men and 
women into a competitive environment using two tasks:  shooting baskets, intended to favor 
males, and solving anagrams, intended to favor females. They found that the proportion of 
participants choosing the competitive environment was higher for males than that for females in 
both scenarios, but that the difference was smaller in the task that favored women. Datta Gupta, 
Poulsen, and Villeval (2011), who use a maze-solving task and examine mixed-sex versus same-
sex competition, provide further support for the competitiveness finding. However, Price (2011) 
was unable to replicate Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), using a seemingly identical 
experimental design. 
Other recent studies examine factors that mediate the relationship between gender and 
preference for competition (e.g., Balafoutas, Kerschbamer, and Sutter, forthcoming) and tasks 
and environments that mitigate this relationship (e.g., Niederle, Segal, and Vesterlund, 2008; 
Dargnies, 2009; Flory, Leibbrandt, and List, 2010; Healy and Pate, 2010). As already noted in 
the introduction, Gneezy, Leonard and List (2009) provide strong evidence that culture-specific 
gender roles and stereotypes play an important role in determining whether males or females 
prefer competition. In contrast, Wozniak, Harbaugh and Mayr (2010) suggest that biological 
factors may matter. They show in a laboratory experiment that females are more likely to avoid 
competition during the low-hormone phase of their menstrual cycle, while during the high-
hormone phase their revealed preference for competition is not significantly different from those 
of the males in the study. As argued by Datta Gupta, Poulsen, and Villeval (2011), this does not 
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provide conclusive evidence of a biological underpinning to the differing preferences of men and 
women. It may instead represent a reaction primed by the onset of menstruation, which occurs 
during the low-hormone phase of the cycle.
1
 None of these papers explicitly examines how 
conflicting gender/family and professional identities among females pursuing a professional 
career in a developed, industrialized country may influence self-selection into more or less 
competitive environments. We use the priming methodology developed in psychology and 
exploited by both psychologists and economists to study issues of identity to tackle this 
important issue. 
 
PRIMING OF SOCIAL IDENTITIES 
According to social identity theory (Turner, 1975; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) 
a person‟s actions are governed by a set of norms and rules associated with various identities, 
such as gender, race, nationality, occupation, or family role. Exposure to a priming stimulus can 
make one identity more salient than others, thereby affecting the person‟s subsequent behavior. 
The power of priming in influencing attitudes and behavior was first demonstrated in social 
psychology. For example, Shih, Pittinsky, and Ambady (1999) showed that Asian-American 
women performed better on a mathematics test when their ethnic identity was activated and 
worse when their gender identity was activated than a control group. They activated the ethnic 
stereotype that Asians are better at math by administering a questionnaire concerning ethnic 
heritage to one group of subjects immediately prior to the math test. Similarly, they activated the 
gender stereotype that females are worse at math by administering a questionnaire concerning 
gender to another group prior to the test. Such a priming effect can occur automatically and 
without conscious awareness (Kawakami, Young, and Dovidio, 2002). Wheeler, DeMarre, and 
Petty (2004) have proposed an active-self-concept theory of priming effects. They argue that the 
                                                        
1 A related literature shows that on some tasks males perform no better than females under non-competitive 
circumstances, but do significantly better in a competitive context (e.g., Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini, 2003; 
Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004; Datta Gupta, Poulsen, and Villeval, 2011). 
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underlying mechanism for such a perception-behavior link is the extent to which traits and 
attitudes of the primed social category become activated to become part of a person‟s active or 
working identity.  
Economists have also become increasingly interested in the notion of social identity, 
applying social identity models to various aspects of economic decision-making (e.g., Akerlof 
and Kranton, 2000; 2002; 2005; 2008; Basu, 2005; 2010; Chen and Li, 2008; Benabou and 
Tirole, 2011; Chen and Chen, 2011). In recent years a number of economics experiments have 
successfully used priming to study the effects of race and ethnicity (Benjamin, Choi, and 
Strickland, 2010; Chen, Li, Liu, Shih, 2010), urban status (Afridi, Li, and Ren, 2009) and 
religion (Benjamin, Choi, and Fisher, 2010) on various aspects of economic behavior. Benjamin, 
Choi, and Strickland (2010) provide a nice model of the relationship between priming and social 
identity, which demonstrates how priming can reveal the marginal effect of increasing the 
strength of a particular social identity. 
We use the idea that social identity has the potential to drive an individual‟s behavior, 
and conjecture that women‟s entry decisions into high-powered tournaments may be influenced 
by their professional (competitive) and family (care-giving and non-competitive) roles, which 
may be in conflict with each other. To test our conjectures, we expose our participants to a 
priming stimulus that can make one identity more salient than the other and thus create 
exogenous variation in the saliency of gender and family stereotypes. Our focal hypothesis is that 
professionally oriented females and males who receive professional priming will demonstrate no 
difference in their propensities to select into a competitive tournament. However, exposure to 
gender/family priming will have different effects on the females relative to the males, opening up 
a gender gap in their propensities to choose the tournament. In particular, under such priming, we 
predict that females will show a lower propensity to select into a competitive pay scheme relative 
to their choices under professional priming. While gender/family priming may cause males to 
become more competitive, as suggested by some of the explanations for the fatherhood premium, 
professional priming is also likely to promote competition. Thus, we make no prediction about 
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the direction of the priming effect on males, hypothesizing only that the probability of a female 
making a competitive choice will decrease (increase) significantly more than the comparable 
male probability when participants receive gender/family (professional) rather than professional 
(gender/family) priming. We also examine beliefs about whether one has ranked first in a 
previously played tournament as a potential mediating variable to determine the extent to which 
priming works by affecting such beliefs. Finally, we look at whether priming has similar effects 
on the selection of a risky gamble, the outcome of which is completely random, and on 
submission of a previous performance to a tournament-based compensation scheme. Our main 
hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Males are more likely than females to enter a competition under 
gender/family priming. 
Hypothesis 2: Males and females are equally likely to enter a competition under 
professional priming. 
Hypothesis 3: Females under professional priming are significantly more likely to enter a 
competition than females under gender/family priming.  
Hypothesis 4: Gender moderates the relationship between priming and preference for 
competition. In particular, the effect of receiving professional versus gender/family priming on 
increasing the probability of a competitive choice is lower for males than for females. 
Hypothesis 5: The relationship between priming, gender, and preference for competition 
is mediated by confidence in one‟s ability to win a tournament as expressed in beliefs about 
whether one has previously finished first in such a competition. 
 
METHODS 
Participants, Experimental Site and Task 
We conducted our experiment at one of Canada‟s most prestigious and elite business 
schools, located in a large urban center.  We recruited participants from the population of full-
time MBA students. These students all had several years of managerial experience prior to 
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entering the MBA program, and by entering the program had put themselves on a highly 
competitive professional career track. We focused on this population because we were seeking to 
examine the hypothesized conflict between professional and gender/family identities among 
highly talented, ambitious and career-oriented women in comparison with similarly talented and 
ambitious men.   
Potential participants were recruited by means of an email solicitation through the MBA 
program listserv. They were told that they would be participating in a study about workplace 
issues and that they would be paid. They were not given any other details prior to the 
experiment. One hundred and thirty-two full-time MBA students participated in the study (66 
men and 66 women) with an average age of 28 years and a standard deviation of 0.276 years. A 
real-effort task that has been previously used in the literature to examine similar issues was 
employed in this study (e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). It is an arithmetic task involving 
the addition of as many sets of five two-digit numbers as possible in a set time frame. The 
numbers for the arithmetic task were randomly generated on the computer. However, the 
experiment was done using paper-and-pencil, rather than on a computer.  
The focus of the experiment was to examine whether gender/family identity and/or 
professional identity, both of which were activated through priming, might have differing 
impacts on preference for competition between female and male MBA students.  Specifically, 
preference for competition was measured through the type of compensation scheme selected 
while holding the job characteristics constant. Priming was implemented by administering a 
questionnaire at the very beginning of an experimental session prior to giving participants any 
instructions about the task or the experimental procedures. About half of the participants (30 men 
and 30 women) received a questionnaire on gender- and family-related concerns at that time, 
while the rest (36 men and 36 women) received a questionnaire concerning their MBA program 
and professional career planning issues. After completing the experimental task, the 
questionnaire not completed prior to the task was administered. Sample items included “what is 
your gender?” and “do you have children?” for the former questionnaire and “what is your 
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GMAT score?” and “What is your salary expectation upon the completion of your degree?” for 
the latter one.
2
  
 
Experimental Procedure  
We ensured that in every session, there were equal numbers of men and women. 
Participants were then divided randomly into groups of four with two men and two women in 
each group. Gender was never explicitly mentioned, but participants could see each other and 
thus observe the gender composition of their own group. Four sessions were conducted. Two 
sessions started with the gender/family-priming questionnaire, while the other two began with 
the professional-priming questionnaire.  
After completing the questionnaire, each participant received instructions about the 
arithmetic task. The experimental instructions were read aloud to the participants while they 
followed along on their own copies. The instructions informed the participants that they would 
begin by playing a two-minute warm-up round and subsequently play several five-minute 
experimental rounds. The warm-up round was designed to familiarize participants with the 
experimental procedure and the real-effort task. They were not told exactly how many rounds 
they would play, but they were told that only one of the experimental rounds would be selected 
at random at the end of the session for payment. This ensured that money earned in one round 
did not affect behavior in a subsequent round, and that each round was considered independent 
and equally important. Lastly, participants were informed that they would receive a $10 show-up 
fee above and beyond their earnings from the task.  
Each participant was provided with a prepared workbook.  For each round, the first page 
in the workbook explained which compensation scheme or condition would apply to the 
upcoming round. Figure 1 provides a sample workbook sheet for a representative experimental 
task. Participants were not permitted to look ahead to future pages or to go back to previous 
                                                        
2 The full questionnaires are presented in the appendix. 
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pages.  They were only allowed to tear off one page and look at the next when instructed to do so 
by the experimenter. After each round, each participant‟s workbook page was collected by the 
experimenters and taken to another room where the number of correct answers was calculated. 
The specific compensation schemes available for each of the experimental rounds were as 
follows: 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
 
Round 1 – Self-Selection of Piece-Rate or Tournament Pay (SS1)  
Participants were asked to decide which one of the two following compensation methods 
they would like to use for calculating their earnings for Round 1. 
Method A: Participants would earn $4.00 for each problem solved correctly.  Thus, total 
earnings for the round would be:  $4.00 × the number of problems solved correctly. Since pay 
depended only on one‟s own performance, there was no competition with others. 
Method B:  One‟s payment would depend on one‟s performance relative to that of the 
other three participants who were sitting in the same row. If one solved more problems than the 
other three persons, one would earn $16.00 for each correctly solved problem. Thus, total 
earnings for the round would be:  $16.00 × the number of problems solved correctly. However, if 
one‟s performance was ranked second, third, or fourth among the participants in the row, one 
would earn $0 regardless of the number of problems solved. If there were ties, the winner would 
be determined randomly from among those who were tied for the best performance. Since a 
participant received a very high rate of compensation, but only if ranked first out of the four 
participants, this pay scheme was highly competitive. Notice that a person choosing this scheme 
must do better than the other three participants to receive compensation regardless of which 
scheme was chosen by those participants.
3
 
                                                        
3 A potential problem with this approach might arise if participants were to perform systematically better under one 
scheme than under the other. In that case, one‟s self-selection into a tournament or piece-rate scheme might depend 
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Round 2 – Imposed Piece-Rate Pay  
Participants were informed that Method A would be used for calculating earnings for 
Round 2. This gave all participants experience with the piece-rate compensation scheme, and 
allowed us to compare the performance of males and females under this pay scheme. 
 
Round 3 – Imposed Tournament Pay  
Participants were informed that Method B would be used for calculating earnings for 
Round 3. This gave all participants experience with the tournament compensation scheme, and 
allowed us to compare the performance of males and females under this pay scheme. For half of 
the participants, rounds 2 and 3 were administered in reverse order to control for order effects 
from learning or other factors. 
 
Round 4 – Self-Selection of Piece-Rate or Tournament Pay (SS2)  
Participants received the same instructions as in Round 1.  This second self-selection was 
designed to determine whether choices changed or remained the same after experience under 
both pay schemes. Cadsby, Song and Tapon (2007) showed that participants in a real-effort 
experiment became better at choosing the most beneficial pay scheme for themselves after 
experiencing each of the pay schemes even in the absence of feedback on their performance. In 
this study, we give each player feedback on their absolute, but not on their relative performance. 
 
Round 5 – Self-Selection of Piece-Rate or Chance Pay (SSC) 
Participants were asked to decide which one of the following two compensation methods 
they would like to use for calculating their earnings for Round 5. 
Method A: Participants would earn $4.00 for each problem solved correctly.  Thus, total 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
in part on one‟s beliefs about how many other people in one‟s row would choose each scheme. However, there was 
no such systematic difference. Neither males nor females in either treatment or in aggregate showed any significant 
differences in performance between the imposed tournament and imposed piece-rate schemes discussed below. 
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earnings for the round would be:  $4.00 × the number of problems solved correctly. 
Method C:  There would be a 25% chance of earning $16.00 for each problem solved 
correctly. There would be a 75% chance of earning $0 regardless of the number of problems 
solved correctly. Since the expected earnings from Method A and Method C are identical, a risk-
averse person would choose Method A to avoid all risk, while a risk-loving person would choose 
Method C. A risk-neutral person would be indifferent between the two choices. Method C is 
identical to Method B under the assumption that each participant has a 25% chance of ranking 
first. Thus, it allowed us to separate attitudes toward financial risk or uncertainty from 
confidence in one‟s ability and attitudes toward competing with others. By isolating the risk 
characteristics of a tournament, we are able to examine whether identity priming affects such risk 
attitudes. 
 
Round 6 – Self-Selection of Piece-Rate or Tournament Pay based on Past Piece-Rate 
Performance  (PSS)  
Participants were told that they did not need to perform in Round 6. Rather if this round 
were randomly selected for payment, their earnings would depend on the number of correct 
answers they provided in Round 2, i.e. the imposed piece-rate pay round. Each participant was 
asked to decide whether s/he would like Method A or Method B applied to her/his past piece-rate 
performance to determine her/his earnings. NV employed such a condition to separate the 
various factors that might affect the choice between tournament and piece-rate compensation 
(e.g. risk attitude, feedback aversion, and overconfidence) from a preference for the act of 
competing itself. Our focus was to examine the extent to which identity priming affects selection 
into such a “near tournament” that did not involve actually having to compete since it was based 
solely on past performance in a non-competitive setting.  
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Round 7 – Self-Selection of Piece-Rate or Tournament Pay based on Past Tournament 
Performance (TSS)  
Participants were told that they did not need to perform in Round 7. Rather if this round 
were randomly selected for payment, their earnings would depend on the number of correct 
answers they provided in Round 3, i.e. the imposed tournament pay round. Each participant was 
asked to decide whether s/he would like Method A or Method B applied to her/his past 
tournament performance to determine her/his earnings. This provides an alternative measure of 
the extent to which identity priming affects the choice between tournament and piece-rate 
compensation in a near tournament that does not involve competing in the future. It may, 
however, differ from the Round-6 measure if participants felt differently about their past 
performance relative to others under an imposed tournament than they did about their past 
performance relative to others under an imposed piece rate. Note that for those participants for 
whom Rounds 2 and 3 were administered in reverse order, Rounds 6 and 7 were administered in 
reverse order as well. 
Rounds 2, 3, 4 and 6 are similar in design to NV. However, NV did not examine identity 
priming. Moreover, in NV‟s self-selection treatment, participants choosing the tournament 
against the other participants‟ performances in the imposed tournament round rather than against 
their contemporaneous performances. We chose to use contemporaneous performances for all 
participants because of the possibility of performance improvement through learning over time.   
 
Post-Experiment Questionnaires 
After participants completed the experimental task, they filled out a questionnaire in 
which they responded to a number of demographic questions such as age and gender. We also 
included belief-assessment questions, which asked participants to guess their ranking relative to 
the other participants in the first four rounds. Each participant was asked to pick a rank between 
one and four, and was paid $4 for a correct guess if that round was selected for payment. 
At the end of the experiment, a number from one to seven was drawn to determine which 
 17 
of the seven rounds was utilized to pay participants. The experiment lasted about an hour and 
participants earned on average $73, inclusive of a $10 show-up fee. All participants were paid 
privately. The relatively high level of compensation was an important feature of the experimental 
design. The MBA students who participated in our sessions pay a very high tuition for their 
education and have high expected earnings. The high-powered financial incentives we provided 
were meant to ensure that they were highly motivated. In fact, participants appeared focused and 
enthusiastic, and worked diligently throughout the experimental session. 
 
RESULTS 
Data Overview and Task Performance 
Table 1 provides a summary of the experimental results by priming treatment and gender. 
Priming appears to have a dramatic influence on self-selection into a competitive tournament. 
Under gender/family priming, 37% of males and just 7% of females selected into the tournament 
in round 1 prior to any experience or feedback on absolute performance. In contrast, under 
professional priming, 25% of both male and female participants chose the tournament. In round 
4, after experiencing both the imposed piece-rate and imposed tournament payment schemes, the 
comparable numbers are 37% of males compared to 10% of females under gender/family 
priming and 17% of males versus 31% of females under professional priming. The results are 
similar for rounds 6 and 7 in which participants decided whether to submit a prior performance 
to a tournament or piece-rate compensation scheme. Fewer people selected into chance pay in 
round 5, but the impact of priming appears similar to its effect in the tournament and near-
tournament rounds. 
Surprisingly, males performed better than females regardless of payment scheme or 
priming treatment. This contrasts with NV, who found no differences in performance under 
either compensation scheme between male and female undergraduates. Table 1, which shows the 
means and correlations between the demographic variables, sheds some light on this issue. In this 
sample of MBA students, maleness is correlated with higher GMAT scores, more managerial 
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experience, higher salary expectations, being older and having children. This is due to a 
combination of applicant pool demographics and the admission policies of the MBA program, 
which are intended to ensure a substantial number of female students. The relative paucity of 
qualified female applicants may of course reflect the general tendency of many women to avoid 
competitive situations, documented in NV and Datta Gupta, Poulsen, and Villeval (2011).  
 
Insert Table 1, 2 and 3 about here. 
 
These factors, particularly the higher average GMAT scores for men, suggest that the males in 
our sample from this particularly competitive managerially oriented population, may on average 
have greater ability at performing the experimental task than the females. Table 3 reports the 
results from two OLS regressions using imposed tournament performance and two OLS 
regressions using imposed piece-rate performance as the dependent variable. In each case, Model 
1 contains three independent variables:  a dummy variable that is 0 for females and 1 for males, a 
dummy variable that is 0 for the gender/family priming treatment and 1 for the professional 
treatment, and an interaction between the two dummy variables. Under both compensation 
schemes, only the coefficient on male is significant (p=0.013 and 0.051 respectively). This both 
confirms the impression from the data summary table that males perform better than females, 
and indicates that the priming treatment made no significant difference in this respect. Model 2 
adds GMAT score to the other independent variables.
4
 The GMAT score is highly significant in 
both cases (p=0.015 and 0.021 respectively).  Moreover, once we control for GMAT score as a 
proxy for ability, the coefficient on the male dummy variable is no longer significant in either 
case. 
                                                        
4 Of the 132 participants in the study, 16 did not answer the question concerning their GMAT scores. Thus, the 
number of observations falls from 132 to 116 when GMAT score is included as an independent variable. We also 
reestimated Model 1 using data from only these 116 participants. The results were qualitatively the same as when all 
132 observations were used to estimate Model 1. This is also true for all of the subsequent statistical analysis 
reported in this paper. 
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Preference for Competition and its Determinants in Rounds 1 and 4  
We begin to investigate self-selection into a competitive tournament using the first self-
selection in round 1 (SS1) as the dependent variable. Since this is a binary categorical variable, 
we estimate a logit regression model.
5
 The results are reported in Table 4. For Model 1, the 
independent variables are the male dummy, the professional-priming dummy and their 
interaction, coded as in Table 3. Model 2 controls for individual ability by adding GMAT score.
6
 
In most cases, our hypotheses are unidirectional as indicated in the discussion and hypotheses 
that conclude Section 3. In those cases, we use one-tailed hypothesis tests and report one-tailed 
p-values.  All such tests are indicated by a 1 superscript. In H1, we predicted that males would be 
more competitive than females under gender/family priming. This is corroborated by significant 
coefficients for the male dummy variable in both Models 1 and 2 (p=0.005 and 0.035 
respectively). For ease of interpretation, we also report marginal effects. On top is the marginal 
effect for the gender/family treatment. For binary categorical variables, the marginal effect is just 
the difference between the probability of entering the tournament when the dummy variable 
equals 1, indicating a male, and the probability of entering when the dummy variable equals 0, 
indicating a female. For example, in Model 1 the number 0.30 indicates that the probability of a 
male entering the tournament exceeds the probability of a female entering the tournament by 
0.30 (0.37 – 0.07). The p-value indicates that this difference is significant (p=0.001), again 
supporting H1. Below is the analogous number for the professional priming treatment.  In this 
case, we use a two-tailed test because H2 predicted no difference between males and females in 
this case. We test this null hypothesis against a two-sided alternative. All such two-sided tests are 
indicated by a 2 superscript. The marginal effect is 0 since the probability of entry is 0.25 for 
both males and females, supporting H2. After controlling for ability by use of GMAT scores in 
Model 2, a significant difference between males and females in the gender/family priming 
                                                        
5 Alternatively, we could use a Probit model. Probit gives almost identical results for all logit estimations reported in 
the paper. 
6 We also estimated a similar model using actual performance in the imposed tournament round rather than GMAT 
score as a proxy for ability. The results were qualitatively similar for this and for the subsequent models using 
GMAT as an ability proxy. 
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treatment remains (p=0.020), while the difference in the professional priming treatment 
continues to be insignificant. Marginal effects are calculated for the average GMAT score, which 
was 660. 
 
Insert Table 4 about here. 
 
H3 predicted that females would be significantly more competitive under professional 
priming than under gender/family priming. It is corroborated by the significant coefficients and 
the significant marginal effects for females in both Models 1 and 2 (p=0.031 and 0.048 
respectively for the two coefficients and p=0.016 and 0.029 respectively for the two marginal 
effects). We made no directional prediction for the effect of priming on males. The two-tailed 
hypothesis test indicates that the marginal effect of priming for males was not significant in 
either model. 
H4 predicts that the marginal effect of the interaction between gender and priming would 
be significantly negative. The significantly negative coefficients indicate that the negative 
interaction effect significantly improves the goodness of fit of both Models 1 and 2 (p=0.017 and 
0.037 respectively). The marginal effect is a test of whether the difference between the priming 
effect for males and the priming effect for females (or equivalently the difference between males 
and females in the priming treatment minus the difference between them in the gender/family 
treatment) is significantly negative as predicted. In Model 1, this number is –0.30 (either 0 – 0.30 
or equivalently –0.12 – 0.18). It is significant as is the comparable number for Model 2 (p=0.017 
and 0.038 respectively), which is evaluated at the average GMAT score of 660, corroborating the 
H4 prediction that gender would moderate the priming effect.
7
 Finally, GMAT score is 
marginally significant using a one-tailed test (p=0.070). The marginal effect for GMAT score is 
                                                        
7 Marginal effects for interactions in non-linear models must be calculated and interpreted with great care. See Ai 
and Norton (2003), Ai, Wang and Norton (2004) and Karaca-Mandic, Norton and Dowd (2011) for a clear and 
insightful discussion of this issue. 
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calculated at the average GMAT score using a weighted average of the marginal effects 
evaluated for males and females in each treatment.  
During rounds 2 and 3, all participants experienced both the piece-rate and tournament 
compensation schemes.  In rounds 1, 2, and 3, each participant received feedback on the number 
of arithmetic questions s/he solved, but not on her/his relative ranking. We conjectured that such 
experience might weaken the effects of identity priming. However, it did not. Table 5 reports the 
logit results for the second self-selection in round 4 (SS2). Models 1 and 2 are specified exactly 
as for SS1 in Table 4, and the interpretation of the coefficients and marginal effects is the same. 
The Model 1 SS2 results are qualitatively similar to the results for SS1 with one interesting 
exception. For SS2, the marginal effect of professional priming for males is negative and 
marginally significant (p=0.063). Thus, there is some suggestive evidence that gender/family 
priming representing male identity in the family has a greater effect on the competitiveness of 
males than professional priming. This is consistent with the literature on the fatherhood wage 
premium (e.g. Glauber, 2008; Hodges and Budig, 2010; Lundberg and Rose, 2000; 2002) as 
discussed above. 
 
Insert Table 5 about here. 
 
When GMAT score is added to the model, its coefficient and marginal effect are now 
both unambiguously significant (p=0.010 and 0.006 respectively) and it has double the marginal 
impact relative to its impact on SS1, reflecting a greater influence of ability on sorting by 
experienced participants. The marginal effect of the male dummy in the gender/family treatment 
is now only marginally significant (p=0.098), giving only weak support to H1. However, the 
marginal effect of male in the professional priming treatment is now significant and negative 
using a two-tailed test (p=0.035), rejecting H2 in an interesting direction. After some experience, 
women primed to activate their professional identity actually exhibit a significantly higher 
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probability of choosing the competitive tournament than do similarly primed males, controlling 
for ability using GMAT scores. Among these participants, it is the males, who compared to 
females with the same GMAT scores, shy away from competition. As with SS1, the marginal 
effect of priming on females remains significant (p=0.020), again supporting H3. The effect of 
priming on males is no longer significant when we control for GMAT score. However, the 
marginal effect of the interaction continues to be significant (p=0.006), again supporting H4. 
 
Mediated Moderation Analysis 
Prior to the SS2 decision in round 4, each participant was exposed to an imposed 
tournament in either round 2 or round 3. As described in the methods section, we gathered data 
on each participant‟s belief regarding her/his ranking in that tournament relative to her/his 
designated competitors. These beliefs were informed by feedback on one‟s own actual number of 
questions solved correctly in the imposed tournament. However, the performance levels of one‟s 
competitors were not revealed prior to the belief solicitation. Of 47 people who believed they 
ranked first in the imposed tournament, 24 chose the tournament in SS2, while of 85 who 
believed their rank was second, third, or fourth, only 7 chose the tournament. All of those 7 
believed they ranked second. This suggests that beliefs about one‟s previous performance in the 
imposed tournament influenced the SS2 choice. H5 predicts that such beliefs may mediate the 
moderated effect of priming on SS2.
8
 We focus on the distinction between those who believed 
they ranked first in the imposed tournament and those who believed they did not rank first. Thus, 
our belief variable is a binary categorical variable.
9
 
 We examine this possibility following the procedures outlined in Baron and Kenny 
(1986). We have already established that priming moderated by gender affects self-selection into 
a competitive tournament. This is Baron and Kenny‟s (1986) step one. We next examine whether 
                                                        
8 Note that in contrast to SS2, SS1 occurs prior to the imposed tournament. Thus, beliefs about one‟s performance in 
the imposed tournament cannot mediate one‟s SS1 choice. 
9 As a robustness check, we also did the analysis using beliefs defined as a four-level categorical variable. The 
results were qualitatively similar, though there was some loss of statistical power because of fewer degrees of 
freedom. 
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priming moderated by gender affects the proposed mediator, beliefs about one‟s performance in 
the imposed tournament. The results are presented in Table 6. Focusing on Model 2, which 
controls for GMAT score, the marginal effect of gender is significant in the gender/family 
priming treatment (p=0.005), but not in the professional treatment, indicating that males were 
significantly more likely than females to believe they finished first, but only under gender/family 
priming. Moreover, exposure to professional as opposed to gender/family priming increases 
significantly the probability that women believe they finished first in the imposed tournament 
(p=0.039), but does not significantly affect men. The marginal effect of the interaction, evaluated 
at the average GMAT score, is negative but with only marginal significance (p=0.082). This is 
the first part of Baron and Kenny‟s (1986) step two.  
 
Insert Table 6 about here. 
 
 The second part of step two involves adding the mediator to the SS2 estimation. The 
results are reported in Model 3 in Table 5. The proposed mediator, beliefs, is significant 
(p=0.000). All of the other coefficients are lower in absolute value than in Model 2, though the 
effect on the interaction coefficient is rather small. However, the marginal effects of male, 
reported both for those who believed they ranked first and for those who did not, were still 
significant for the professional priming treatment (p=0.038 and 0.002, respectively). Thus, even 
when we control for beliefs, males continue to choose the tournament significantly less often 
than females under professional priming.  The marginal effect of professional priming on 
females becomes only marginally significant when controlling for beliefs, while the interaction 
term and its marginal effects remain significant (p=0.046 and 0.021 respectively). This suggests 
that beliefs about one‟s ranking in the imposed tournament only partially mediate the moderated 
effect of priming on SS2, partially corroborating H5.  
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Step three involves adding interactions between priming and beliefs as well as gender and 
beliefs to the model to see whether the mediator is itself moderated by either the treatment 
variable or the moderator. None of these interactions is significant.
10
 Thus, the moderated effect 
of identity priming on preference for competition seems to work both indirectly through its effect 
on how optimistic one feels about one‟s ranking in a previously administered tournament as well 
as directly on the selection decision itself. 
 
Gender, Priming, Risk Attitude and Near Tournaments 
Tournaments not only involve competition. They also involve financial uncertainty or 
risk. In our study, the selection of a tournament involved greater financial uncertainty than the 
selection of piece-rate compensation. Initially, we planned to consider risk attitude as an 
additional potential mediator. The idea was that in addition to affecting beliefs about one‟s 
ranking in a tournament, priming might have analogous effects on risk attitude moderated by 
gender. This in turn might provide an additional indirect pathway affecting the decision to select 
into a competitive tournament. The risk characteristics of a tournament were isolated from 
performance ranking by giving participants the choice of either chance pay or a piece rate in 
round 5 (SSC). Those selecting chance pay revealed themselves to be risk-loving or risk-neutral, 
while those selecting into the piece rate revealed themselves to be risk-averse or risk-neutral. 
Table 7 presents the results of a linear probability model using selection into SSC as the 
dependent variable.
11
 Males are significantly more likely to choose chance pay under 
gender/family priming (p=0.015), but not under professional priming. Professional priming has a 
marginally significant positive effect on the propensity of females to select chance pay in Model 
1 (p=0.078), but is not significant when GMAT is added in Model 2 (p=0.150). In both models, 
professional priming has a marginally significant negative effect on the propensity of males to 
select chance pay. GMAT score itself is not significant. The interaction is significant (p=0.011 
                                                        
10 These results are omitted to save space. However, they are available from the authors upon request. 
11 The logit model did not achieve convergence. 
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and 0.023 for Models 1 and 2 respectively), indicating that the effect of priming on the 
probability of selecting chance pay is moderated by gender. 
 
Insert Table 7 about here. 
 
However, when SSC is added as an independent variable along with beliefs about one‟s 
ranking in a previously played tournament to the SS2 logit regression, it is not significant.
12
 
Thus, it cannot be considered an additional mediating variable in the relationship between 
priming moderated by gender and selection into a tournament. This result prompted us to 
examine the relationship between SSC and ranking beliefs despite there being no obvious reason 
that a person who believes he has performed relatively better than others in a tournament should 
exhibit a higher probability of taking a risky gamble. We found that all eight participants who 
selected chance pay were also among the 39 out of 132 who believed they had finished first in 
the imposed tournament. Thus, it appears that for some participants the same forces that drove 
them to believe they ranked first in the imposed tournament also gave them confidence that luck 
would go their way in a completely random game of chance. As indicated by the results in Table 
7, these forces encompass identity priming moderated by gender. Thus, while risk attitude does 
not appear to represent a mediating variable in the relationship between moderated priming and 
selection into a tournament, it seems to be part of the same identity package and thus influenced 
by the same factors. 
NV examined not only the effect of gender on selection into a competitive tournament, 
but also whether it would affect a choice between submitting a previous piece-rate performance 
to a piece-rate or tournament payment scheme. The idea was to present their participants with the 
possibility of choosing a tournament payment scheme without subsequently having the 
opportunity actually to compete in a tournament.
13
  As they pointed out, such a choice would 
                                                        
12 The results are not reported here to save space, but are available from the authors upon request. 
13 As in our design, participants were paid for one round selected at random at the end of the experiment. 
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involve many of the factors that might affect choice into a tournament such as risk attitude, 
confidence and attitude towards receiving feedback on one‟s rank. However, it would not 
involve the thrill or discomfort, as the case may be, of actually competing. We also consider such 
a choice to determine whether the selection of such a near tournament (P-SS) is also affected by 
moderated identity priming mediated by beliefs.  
The results are presented in Table 8. In Model 1 without controlling for GMAT score, 
males are significantly more likely to select into such a near tournament then females under 
gender/family priming (p=0.028). This gender effect disappears with the addition of the GMAT 
control in Model 2. The main effect of identity priming is not significant for either males or 
females in either model. However, the interaction and its marginal effect are significant in both 
(p=0.038 and 0.053 for coefficients and p=0.033 and 0.09 for marginal effects respectively) 
though smaller than for either the SS2 or SS3 cases. GMAT score is also significant (p=0.034). 
Thus, while moderated identity priming affects this choice, the effect is attenuated relative to that 
on selection into a real tournament.  
We also do a mediation analysis using beliefs about whether one did or did not finish first 
in one‟s group under the previously played imposed piece rate. Table 9 indicates that when 
controlling for GMAT score, nothing but the GMAT covariate matters. Thus, beliefs about one‟s 
ranking in the imposed tournament do not mediate moderated priming. When the belief variable 
is added to the P-SS logit regression, it does however completely mediate the GMAT score 
covariate. Participants with high GMAT scores are more likely to believe they ranked first in 
their group and hence are more likely to submit their piece rate score to a tournament pay 
scheme. The interaction effect becomes marginally significant. In the absence of an actual 
tournament, the effects of priming moderated by gender are much reduced. 
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Insert Table 8, 9 and 10 about here. 
 
Finally, we also gave participants the choice to submit their imposed tournament 
performance to either a piece-rate or a tournament scheme (T_SS). This is also a near tournament 
with the similar properties to the earlier choice. However, the earlier choice was based on an 
imposed piece-rate performance for which participants had little financial reason to focus on 
ranking first. In this case, there was such a motivation. Table 10 reports the results. The results 
are similar to those for SS2. The major difference is that there continues to be a significant 
gender effect (p=0.035) under gender/family priming when GMAT is added to the model. Not 
surprisingly, participants‟ beliefs about whether or not they ranked first in the imposed 
tournament partially mediate the moderated effect of priming. However, the direct effect of 
moderated priming remains strong. Only GMAT score loses its significance. Hypotheses H1, H3, 
H4, and H5 are all supported for this near tournament. As with SS2, the null hypothesis H2 is 
rejected in the direction of females being more competitive than males under professional 
priming (p=0.010 and 0.029 for those who believed s/he has previously finished first in such a 
competition and who lacked such a belief respectively). Thus, it appears that moderated identity 
priming can affect decisions about entry into a near tournament that does not involve a 
subsequent competitive performance much as it affects selection into a tournament that does 
require such a performance. However, this resemblance requires that the prior performance for 
which a pay scheme is being selected was actually played as a competitive tournament. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 In this study, we focus on a very special population, namely people who have 
successfully gained admission and are currently participating in a highly selective and 
competitive MBA program. We chose to examine this population because we are interested in 
studying a conflict of professional and gender/family identities that may coexist within the hearts 
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and minds of many highly competitive female professionals, and comparing its behavioral 
impact with that of the reinforcing identities that drive many competitive male professionals. We 
show that for such women identity priming significantly affects willingness to participate in 
competitive tournaments, to take risky gambles and to select into a tournament pay scheme based 
on an earlier imposed tournament performance. A similar but far weaker effect occurs when 
participants decide whether to submit their former piece-rate performance to a piece-rate or 
tournament compensation scheme. Such priming has significantly different effects on males from 
the same population. This contrast highlights an identity conflict for the females in our study that 
was absent for the males. Within this specific population, one particularly surprising result 
emerged. Initially, for SS1, females under gender/family priming were less likely than males to 
select into a tournament, whether or not we controlled for ability using GMAT score as a proxy, 
while under professional priming there was no such difference between males and females. After 
gaining experience with both a piece rate and a tournament however, behavior changed. For SS2, 
the higher probability of a male selecting into a competitive tournament under gender/family 
priming vanished with the GMAT score control. Moreover, under professional priming females 
exhibited a significantly higher likelihood than males of selecting into a competitive tournament. 
Within this select population of ambitious future managers, a male was more likely to shy away 
from competition than was his female counterpart with an identical GMAT score under 
professional priming.  
 The effect of identity priming, moderated by gender, on the second selection into a 
competitive tournament (SS2) worked via two pathways. The first was through its effect on 
beliefs about one‟s ranking under the previously played imposed tournament. The second was a 
direct effect on SS2, controlling for such beliefs. The same can be said for the moderated effect 
of priming on the decision to submit a previously played tournament performance to a 
tournament rather than a piece-rate pay scheme.  
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Theoretical Contributions 
The moderated effect of identity priming on preference for competition demonstrated in 
this experiment is important for two reasons. First, following Benjamin, Choi, and Strickland 
(2010), it is an indicator of the marginal impact of two conflicting identities that may have an 
important influence on the extent to which female professionals choose to compete. Whereas for 
such women, gender/family and professional identities may often be at cross-purposes, for male 
professionals this is rarely the case. Second, outside the lab managerial professionals are 
frequently exposed to priming through life‟s important events. These can activate and thus 
strengthen the impact of gender/family and/or professional identities on behavior. Marriage, 
pregnancy and parenthood may all bring out gender/family identity. Whatever professional 
priming is received in the workplace, the cry of one‟s small child is likely to have a strong 
offsetting impact for many female professionals. The effect on many male professionals might be 
equally strong, but not necessarily at odds with their professional identity. 
 This study also contributes to the literature on the motherhood and gender wage gaps. In 
particular, it suggests that while employer discrimination against mothers or in favor of males or 
fathers may exist, many mothers may find themselves pulled by their identity as women/mothers 
away from full and committed participation in the competitive environment of the corporate 
world, while many males/fathers may not face this conflict. While the focus of this study is the 
impact of conflicting identities on female professionals, it also suggests that the impact of 
gender/family identity may be even stronger for women who have chosen not to pursue 
managerial or professional careers. Thus, the motherhood and gender wage gaps may in part be 
explained by such choices. The study also sheds light on how social norms reflected in 
gender/family identities may explain previous findings about gender differences in preference 
towards competition (e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Gneezy, Leonard, and List, 2009; 
Datta Gupta, Poulsen, and Villeval, 2011). 
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Methodological Limitations and Caveats 
 Like all studies, this one has limitations. First, it may have been preferable to implement 
a control treatment with no priming of any kind. This would have enabled us to compare each of 
our identity priming treatments to a control rather than only to each other. We made the difficult 
decision not to implement such a control for two reasons. The first and major reason was 
practical. We had access to students in a small elite MBA program. We used almost all of the 
females in that program in our study. There were simply no more females and very few available 
males to participate in another treatment. To implement a control treatment, we would have had 
to reduce the number of participants in the identity priming treatments. We felt this cost was too 
high. In order to have sufficient statistical power to compare gender/family priming with 
professional priming, we felt it necessary to assign all of our available participants to one of the 
priming treatments. The second reason was that although we could implement a treatment in 
which we did not prime the participants as part of the experimental design, we could not control 
the priming of everyday life that participants might experience prior to their arrival at the 
experimental site. Thus, if for example, professional priming were shown not to differ 
significantly from the control, it would not be clear how this should be interpreted. It could mean 
that professional identity had no significant impact on our participants. However, it could also 
mean that the students were already so overloaded with professional priming from their MBA 
classes, clubs and social activities that the effect of our experimental manipulation was 
negligible. Thus, we felt it more valuable to devote our scarce resources to the two priming 
treatments. 
 Second, we use a competitive tournament to represent competition. However, 
competition may come in many other forms. Unable to study all forms of competition in this 
experiment, we concentrated on tournament-pay as a proxy for competitive environments 
because they are a simple and direct form of competition and thus a good place to begin 
examining the willingness to compete. Moreover, it allows us to relate to the existing literature. 
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Future research should extend this route of inquiry and examine other types of competitive 
environments where for example people vie for status and prestige rather than only money. 
Third, even though we employed high-powered incentives in the lab, the money at stake 
in our experiment was still far less than a year‟s worth of pay for a typical managerial employee. 
Of course, we cannot create a situation identical to a real-world workplace in the laboratory. We 
acknowledge that higher stakes may affect preferences for competition. A number of studies 
have examined the extent to which monetary stakes matter to behavioral decisions in a variety of 
contexts. Over a broad range of situations, these studies demonstrate that as long as the financial 
stakes in a behavioral experiment are equal to or greater than the opportunity cost of a person‟s 
time (i.e., the amount one could earn elsewhere), there are usually no significant effects on 
behavior (e.g., Slonim and Roth, 1998, Camerer, 2003). Of course, it is always possible that our 
particular context was an exception to these general findings. This possibility warrants further 
examination. 
The laboratory nature of the task and the obvious experimental manipulations necessarily 
limit the direct transferability of our results to complex organizational settings. In addition, the 
time frame in the lab was very short, compared to workplace time frames. These factors may also 
have affected behavior and decisions. We acknowledge the short-term nature of the effects of 
priming. However, given the continuing under-representation of females in high-profile positions 
in all walks of life, it is reasonable to conjecture that dominant cultural norms and value-systems 
in our society may have created a situation of repeated priming of stereotypes and their related 
identities, which then become internalized as long-term attitudes and preferences.   
Despite these limitations, we believe this study makes an important contribution. The use 
of a laboratory experiment allows us to control for many extraneous and unobservable factors 
that can affect identity salience in the field, and thus focus sharply on its manipulation by means 
of two precisely-defined identity priming treatments. Since every methodology has its strengths 
and weaknesses, we strongly believe that a variety of approaches should be employed to examine 
such important questions as the differing effects of identity priming on preference for 
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competition between males and females. A multifaceted approach can help scholars learn more 
about proposed theories than any one methodological approach alone.  
 
Implications for Managerial Practice, Policy Making and Future Research 
Our study provokes a critical question: is it possible to alter how women perceive and 
experience competition? We show that it is possible in the lab. Does this imply that priming 
techniques could be used to “socially engineer” preferences for competition in the real world? 
Might the use of priming to activate professional identities in the workplace help reduce the 
motherhood wage penalty and the gender wage gap? Would this be beneficial for women? 
Whether this is possible in the real world is an open question that requires further study. Whether 
it is desirable is an even more challenging question that requires study from a variety of 
methodological perspectives. This study emphasizes the importance of identity by manipulating 
it in the laboratory through priming. However, the fact that it is important does not necessarily 
imply that it should be manipulated. For example, any policy meant to manipulate the salience of 
professional identity versus gender/family identity in the real world must take into account not 
only its effect on men and women at work, but also its effect on men, women and children within 
the family. Moreover, any proposal for one group of people to use priming techniques to 
manipulate the identity of others, no matter how well-intentioned, must confront difficult ethical 
issues of power and control that extend well beyond the scope of this study.  
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Figure 1: Sample Workbook Page    
            Answer               Answer 
Q1 69 95 12 72 25    Q21 33 55 40 65 48  
Q2 95 36 77 85 50    Q22 37 79 88 21 64  
Q3 80 82 55 24 31    Q23 12 38 12 48 49  
Q4 65 72 97 87 74    Q24 41 79 33 96 60  
Q5 25 30 12 72 97    Q25 18 44 68 11 34  
Q6 83 49 47 37 49    Q26 38 54 83 64 97  
Q7 30 93 74 71 44    Q27 81 27 85 31 87  
Q8 87 80 14 17 27    Q28 37 77 21 92 84  
Q9 51 27 71 76 63    Q29 43 87 83 32 59  
Q10 31 41 40 10 19    Q30 48 73 94 75 35  
Q11 15 17 76 46 30    Q31 44 65 79 81 69  
Q12 68 87 98 49 37    Q32 63 98 72 46 64  
Q13 14 74 50 85 50    Q33 94 73 54 12 13  
Q14 25 15 15 10 92    Q34 81 36 43 88 71  
Q15 20 13 88 22 37    Q35 83 99 38 20 35  
Q16 59 42 99 50 81    Q36 19 11 99 44 53  
Please do not turn this page till you are instructed so. 
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Table 1. Data Overview 
 Family Priming Treatment Professional Priming 
Treatment 
 Men 
(n=30) 
Women 
(n=30) 
Men 
(n=36) 
Women  
(n=36) 
Round 1: Self-Selection 1 of Tournament Pay (SS1) 0.37 0.07 0.25 0.25 
Round 1 Performance 16.40 12.23 15.14 13.56 
Imposed Piece-rate Round Performance 16.07 13.33 15.53 13.83 
Imposed Tournament Round Performance 15.83 12.40 15.47 13.35 
Round 4: Self-Selection 2 of Tournament Pay (SS2) 0.37 0.10 0.17 0.31 
Round 4 Performance 16.33 13.20 15.58 13.75 
Round 5: Self-Selection of Chance Pay (SSC) 0.13 0.00 0.03 0.09 
Round 7: Self-Selection of Tournament Pay for Piece-
rate Round (PSS)  
0.43 0.20 0.28 0.39 
Round 6: Self-Selection of Tournament Pay for 
Tournament Round (TSS) 
0.37 0.10 0.25 0.31 
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Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev.  
1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  
1.Male 0.50 0.047       
2.Married 0.22 0.039 0.114      
3.Have Children 0.05 0.021 0.146* 0.441***     
4.GMAT Score 660 51.21 0.313*** 0.107 -0.005    
5.Managerial Experience 4.71 0.213 0.173** 0.344*** 0.324 0.067   
6.Target Salary 90820 1710 0.365*** 0.119 0.149* 0.266** 0.266**  
7.Age 27.56 0.276 0.173** 0.442*** 0.442*** -.080 0.763*** 0.205** 
Note: n=132. *, ** and *** denote p < 0.05, 0.01, 0.001 respectively. 
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Table 3. Determinants of Imposed Piece-rate/Tournament Rounds Performance 
(OLS regressions with two-tailed p-values in parentheses) 
 Imposed Tournament Round Imposed Piece-Rate Round 
 Model 1 
(n=132) 
Model 2 
(n=116) 
Model 1 
(n=132) 
Model 2 
(n=116) 
Constant 12.4 
(0.000) 
-1.70 
(0.786) 
13.33 
(0.000) 
-0.307 
(0.962) 
Gender (Male=1)  3.43 
(0.013) 
1.63 
(0.278) 
2.733 
(0.051) 
0.780 
(0.613) 
Priming (Professional 
Priming=1) 
0.961 
(0.463) 
-0.500 
(0.728) 
0.500 
(0.707) 
-0.850 
(0.566) 
Interaction -1.32 
(0.475) 
0.526 
(0.786) 
-1.04 
(0.581) 
0.632 
(0.752) 
GMAT  0.023 
(0.015) 
 0.023 
(0.021) 
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Table 4. Determinants of SS1 (Logit regressions with p-values in parentheses) 
 
 Model 1 
(n=132) 
Model 2 
(n=116) 
 Coef 
(p-value) 
Marginal 
(p-value) 
Coef 
(p-value) 
Marginal 
(p-value) 
Gender 
(Male=1)  
2.09 
(0.005)
1
 
0.30
G
 
(0.001)
1
 
0.000
P
 
(1.000)
2
 
1.54 
(0.035)
1
 
0.23
 G
 
(0.020)
1
 
-0.05
 P
 
(0.651)
2
 
Priming 
(Professional 
Priming=1) 
1.54 
(0.031)
1
 
0.18
F
 
(0.016)
1
 
-0.12
M
 
(0.305)
2
 
1.43 
(0.048)
1
 
0.20
 F
 
(0.029)
1
 
-0.08
M
 
(0.494)
2
 
Interaction -2.09 
(0.017)
1
 
-0.30 
(0.017)
1
 
-1.81 
(0.037)
1
 
-0.28 
(0.038)
1
 
GMAT   0.007 
(0.075)
1
 
0.001 
(0.070)
1
 
Constant -2.64 
(0.000)
2
 
 -6.76 
(0.034)
2
 
 
Note: 
1
 and 
2 
denote one-tailed and two-tailed p-values respectively. 
G
, 
P
, 
M
 and 
F
 denote marginal effects estimated at the 
average GMAT level for the gender/family-priming treatment, professional-priming treatment, males and females respectively. The 
marginal effect for GMAT score is calculated at the average GMAT score using a weighted average of the marginal effects evaluated 
for males and females in each treatment. 
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Table 5. Determinants of SS2 (Logit regressions with p-values in parentheses) 
 Model 1 
(n=132) 
Model 2 
(n=116) 
Model 3 
(n=116) 
 Coef 
(p-value) 
Marginal 
(p-value) 
Coef 
(p-value) 
Marginal 
(p-value) 
Coef 
(p-value) 
Marginal 
(p-value) 
Gender 
(Male=1)  
1.65 
(0.010)
1
 
0.27
G
 
(0.005)
1
 
-0.14
P
 
(0.160)
2
 
0.93 
(0.110)
1
 
0.14
G
 
(0.098)
1
 
-0.24
P
 
(0.035)
2
 
0.15 
(0.432)
1
 
At belief=0 
0.01
G
 
(0. 432)
1
 
-0.16
P
 
(0.038)
2
 
At belief=0 
0.04
G
 
(0. 432)
1
 
-0.47
P
 
(0.002)
2
 
Priming 
(Professional 
Priming=1) 
1.38 
(0.026)
1
 
0.21
F
 
(0.014)
1
 
-0.20
M
 
(0.063)
2
 
1.37 
(0.033)
1
 
0.24
F
 
(0.020)
1
 
-0.14
M
 
(0.153)
2
 
1.08 
(0.099)
1
 
At belief=0 
0.12
F
 
(0.095)
1
 
-0.05
M
 
(0.203)
2
 
At belief=0 
0.25
F
 
(0.102)
1
 
-0.25
M
 
(0.095)
2
 
Interaction -2.44 
(0.004)
1
 
-0.41 
(0.023)
1
 
-2.26 
(0.004)
1
 
-0.38 
(0.006)
1
 
-2.18 
(0.023)
1
 
At belief=0 
-0.17 
(0.046)
1
 
At belief=0 
-0.50 
(0.021)
1
 
GMAT   0.012 
(0.010)
1
 
0.002 
(0.006)
1
 
0.009 
(0.068)
1
 
0.001 
(0.063)
1
 
Belief  
as Mediator 
    2.41 
(0.000)
1
 
0.39 
(0.000)
1
 
Constant -2.20 
(0.000)
2
 
 -9.79 
(0.005)
2
 
 -8.19 
(0.037)
2
 
 
 Note: 
1
 and 
2 
denote one-tailed and two-tailed p-values respectively. 
G
, 
P
, 
M
 and 
F
 denote marginal effects estimated at the 
average GMAT level for the gender/family-priming treatment, professional-priming treatment, males and females respectively. Belief 
was measured as beliefs about whether or not one ranked first in the previously played imposed tournament round. The marginal 
effect for GMAT score is calculated at the average GMAT score using a weighted average of the marginal effects evaluated for males 
and females in each treatment. 
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Table 6. Determinants of Belief of Whether or Not one Ranked First in the Imposed Tournament Round 
(Logit regressions with p-values in parentheses) 
 Model 1 
(n=132) 
Model 2 
(n=116) 
 Coef 
(p-value) 
Marginal 
(p-value) 
Coef 
(p-value) 
Marginal 
(p-value) 
Gender 
(Male=1)  
2.01 
(0.001)
1
 
0.40
G
 
(0.000)
1
 
0.19
P
 
(0.082)
2
 
1.68 
(0.012)
1
 
0.31
G
 
(0.005)
1
 
0.07
P
 
(0.577)
2
 
Priming 
(Professional 
Priming=1) 
0.92 
(0.080)
1
 
0.14
F
 
(0.068)
1
 
-0.06
M
 
(0.620)
2
 
1.22 
(0.053)
1
 
0.20
F
 
(0.039)
1
 
-0.04
M
 
(0.774)
2
 
Interaction -1.16 
(0.078)
1
 
-0.21 
(0.095)
1
 
-1.37 
(0.068)
1
 
-0.24 
(0.082)
1
 
GMAT   0.013 
(0.003)
1
 
0.003 
(0.000)
1
 
Constant -1.87 
(0.000)
2
 
 -10.44 
(0.001)
2
 
 
Note: 
1
 and 
2 
denote one-tailed and two-tailed p-values respectively. 
G
, 
P
, 
M
 and 
F
 denote marginal effects estimated at the 
average GMAT level for the gender/family-priming treatment, professional-priming treatment, males and females respectively. The 
marginal effect for GMAT score is calculated at the average GMAT score using a weighted average of the marginal effects evaluated 
for males and females in each treatment. 
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Table 7. Determinants of SSC (Linear Probability Model with p-values in parentheses) 
               
Model 1 
(n=132) 
 
Model 2  
(n=116) 
 Coef 
(p-value) 
Coef 
(p-value) 
Gender (Male=1)  0.13 
(0.015)
1
 
0.14 
(0.024)
1
 
Priming (Professional 
Priming=1) 
0.08 
(0.078)
1
 
0.07 
(0.150)
1
 
Interaction -0.19 
(0.011)
1
 
-0.18 
(0.023)
1
 
GMAT (centered)  0.0002 
(0.358)
1
 
Constant 0 
(1.000)
2
 
0.002 
(0.485)
2
 
 Note: 
1
 and 
2 
denote one-tailed and two-tailed p-values respectively.  
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Table 8. Determinants of PSS (p-values are in parentheses) 
 Model 1 
(n=132) 
Model 2 
(n=116) 
Model 3 
(n=116) 
 Coef 
(p-value) 
Marginal 
(p-value) 
Coef 
(p-value) 
Marginal 
(p-value) 
Coef 
(p-value) 
Marginal 
(p-value) 
Gender 
(Male=1)  
1.12 
(0.028)
1
 
0.23
G
 
(0.022)
1
 
-0.06
P
 
(0.598)
2
 
0.72 
(0.135)
1
 
0.15
G
 
 (0.128)
1
 
-0.13
P
 
(0.262)
2
 
0.36 
 (0.314)
1
 
At belief=0 
0.04
G
 
(0.313)
1
 
-0.11
P
 
(0.165)
2
 
At belief=0 
0.08
G
 
(0.315)
1
 
-0.24
P
 
(0.126)
2
 
Priming 
(Professional 
Priming=1) 
0.57 
(0.166)
1
 
0.11
F
 
(0.158)
1
 
-0.18
M
 
(0.113)
2
 
0.69 
(0.143)
1
 
0.14
F
 
(0.135)
1
 
-0.14
M
 
(0.219)
2
 
0.54 
(0.227)
1
 
At belief=0 
0.07
F
 
(0.224)
1
 
-0.08
M
 
(0.232)
2
 
At belief=0 
0.13
F
 
(0.229)
1
 
-0.20
M
 
(0.181)
2
 
Interaction -1.40 
(0.038)
1
 
-0.29 
(0.033)
1
 
-1.37 
(0.053)
1
 
-0.28 
(0.049)
1
 
-1.36 
(0.078)
1
 
At belief=0 
-0.16 
(0.093)
1
 
At belief=0 
-0.32 
(0.075)
1
 
GMAT   0.008 
(0.034)
1
 
0.002 
(0.028)
1
 
0.004 
(0.243)
1
 
0.004 
(0.206)
1
 
Belief as 
Mediator 
    2.26 
(0.000)
1
 
0.45 
(0.000)
1
 
 
Constant -1.39 
(0.002)
2
 
 -6.63 
(0.027)
2
 
 -4.33 
(0.202)
2
 
 
Note: 
1
 and 
2 
denote one-tailed and two-tailed p-values respectively. 
G
, 
P
, 
M
 and 
F
 denote marginal effects estimated at the 
average GMAT level for the gender/family-priming treatment, professional-priming treatment, males and females respectively. Belief 
was measured as beliefs about whether or not one ranked first in the previously played imposed piece-rate round. The marginal effect 
for GMAT score is calculated at the average GMAT score using a weighted average of the marginal effects evaluated for males and 
females in each treatment. 
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Table 9. Determinants of Belief of Whether or Not one Ranked First in the Imposed Piece-Rate Round 
(Logit regressions with p-values in parentheses) 
 
 Model 1 
(n=132) 
Model 2 
(n=116) 
 Coef 
(p-value) 
Marginal 
(P-value) 
Coef 
 
Marginal 
(P-value) 
Gender 
(Male=1)  
1.61 
(0.004)
1
 
0.33
G
 
(0.002)
1
 
0.14
P
 
(0.219)
2
 
0.90 
(0.084)
1
 
0.19
G
 
(0.075)
1
 
0.04
P
 
(0.727)
2
 
Priming 
(Professional 
Priming=1) 
0.79 
(0.097)
1
 
0.14
F
 
(0.088)
1
 
-0.06
M
 
(0.652) 
0.58 
(0.193)
1
 
0.11
F
 
(0.153)
1
 
-0.03
M
 
(0.805) 
Interaction -1.01 
(0.099)
1
 
-0.21 
(0.112)
1
 
-0.71 
(0.202)
1
 
-0.15 
(0.209)
1
 
GMAT   0.012 
(0.003)
1
 
0.003 
(0.002)
1
 
Constant -1.61 
(0.001)
2
 
 -9.47 
(0.002)
2
 
 
Note: 
1
 and 
2 
denote one-tailed and two-tailed p-values respectively. 
G
, 
P
, 
M
 and 
F
 denote marginal effects estimated at the 
average GMAT level for the gender/family-priming treatment, professional-priming treatment, males and females respectively. The 
marginal effect for GMAT score is calculated at the average GMAT score using a weighted average of the marginal effects evaluated 
for males and females in each treatment. 
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Table 10. Determinants of TSS (Logit regressions with p-values in parentheses) 
 Model 1 
(n=132) 
Model 2 
(n=116) 
Model 3 
(n=116) 
 Coef 
(p-value) 
Marginal 
(p-value) 
Coef 
 
Marginal 
(p-value) 
Coef 
(p-value) 
Marginal 
(p-value) 
Gender 
(Male=1)  
1.65 
(0.011)
1
 
0.27
G
 
(0.005)
1
 
-0.11
P
 
(0.314)
2
 
1.54 
(0.035)
1
 
0.22
G
 
(0.020)
1
 
-0.23
P
 
(0.061)
2
 
0.83 
(0.191)
1
 
At belief=0 
0.05
G
 
(0.191)
1
 
-0.21
P
 
(0.029)
2
 
At belief=1 
0.20
G
 
(0.181)
1
 
-0.36
P
 
(0.010)
2
 
Priming 
(Professional 
Priming=1) 
1.75 
(0.006)
1
 
0.29
F
 
(0.001)
1
 
-0.09
M
  
(0.441)
2
 
2.19 
(0.004)
1
 
0.38
F 
 (0.000)
1
 
-0.08
M
 
(0.496)
2
 
2.09 
(0.012)
1
 
At belief=0 
0.23
F
 
(0.009)
1
 
-0.03
M
 
(0.545)
2
 
At belief=1 
0.46
F
 
(0.010)
1
 
-0.10
M
 
(0.522)
2
 
Interaction -2.15 
(0.007)
1
 
-0.38 
(0.006)
1
 
-2.58 
(0.005)
1
 
-0.45 
(0.002)
1
 
-2.49 
(0.013)
1
 
At belief=0 
-0.26 
(0.009)
1
 
At belief=1 
-0.56 
(0.013)
1
 
GMAT   0.007 
(0.063)
1
 
0.001 
(0.056)
1
 
0.001 
(0.388)
1
 
0.0002 
(0.388)
1
 
Belief as 
Mediator 
    2.52 
(0.000)
1
 
0.44 
(0.000)
1
 
Constant -2.19 
(0.000)
2
 
 -6.85 
(0.025)
2
 
 -4.04 
(0.250)
2
 
 
Note: 
1
 and 
2 
denote one-tailed and two-tailed p-values respectively. 
G
, 
P
, 
M
 and 
F
 denote marginal effects estimated at the 
average GMAT level for the gender/family-priming treatment, professional-priming treatment, males and females respectively. Belief 
was measured as beliefs about whether or not one ranked first in the previously played imposed tournament round. The marginal 
effect for GMAT score is calculated at the average GMAT score using a weighted average of the marginal effects evaluated for males 
and females in each treatment. 
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Appendix 1: Priming Instruments 
 
Gender/Family Priming Questionnaire 
1. What is your gender?  M  F  
2. Are you married? Yes  No 
3. Are you in a stable relationship?  Yes  No 
4. Do you have child(ren)? Yes  No 
5. Are you planning to have children in the next 5 years? Yes  No 
6. Are you going to be the main care-giver (rather than your partner) of your child(ren) once you have child(ren)? Yes     No 
7. Once you have children, do you plan to continue to work full-time? Yes  No 
 
Professional Priming Questionnaire 
1. Are you a full-time MBA student? Yes  No 
2. What is your GMAT score?_________ 
3. What was your professional background? ______________ 
4. How many years of managerial experience do you have?______________ 
5. What area would you like to specialize in for your MBA training?_____________ 
6. What is your salary expectation upon the completion of your MBA degree?___________ 
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Appendix 2: General Instructions and Workbook Instructions 
General Instructions 
Thank you for participating today. All of your responses in this study will remain completely anonymous.  It is important 
that during this experiment you do not talk or make any noise that might disrupt others around you.  If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will answer your questions individually. 
During this experiment you will be asked to add up sets of five double-digit integers such as the following.  
98 42 69 50 78   
 
The first round is a warm-up round for you to get familiar with the task while the rest of the rounds will be experimental 
rounds which will be used to calculate your earnings as explained below. You are not allowed to use a calculator, but may 
write numbers down on scratch paper provided by us. The numbers are randomly drawn and each problem is presented as 
above. 
You will have a Workbook that will contain all of your work.  Your task in each round is to solve problems. Your earnings in this 
experiment will depend on your performance and/or the specific compensation method applied to each of the experimental 
rounds. Only of one the experimental rounds will be selected at random for payment at the conclusion of the session. 
Once we begin the experiment, you will not be able to look ahead to future pages or to go back to previous pages.   
To ensure confidentiality, just write down your participant number on each page of the Workbook.  Please do not write your 
name on any of these materials.  
Please make sure that you completely understand the instructions for the experiment. Once again, remember not to make any 
noises that might disturb others around you.  If you have any questions, raise your hand and we will answer your questions 
individually. 
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Workbook Instructions 
Please write all of your work in this Workbook and turn pages only when instructed to do so. 
The next round is a warm-up round and it will last for 2 minutes. There is no payment for this round. 
Please wait for instructions before you turn this page. 
 
Compensation Method for Round 1 
Round 1 will last 5 minutes. For this round, please decide which one of the two following compensation methods you would like to use for 
calculating your earnings: 
Method A: You will earn $4.00 for each problem you solve correctly.  Thus, your total earnings for this round will be:  $4.00 × the number 
of problems solved correctly. 
 
Method B:  Your payment will depend on your performance relative to that of the other three participants who are sitting in your row. If 
the number of problems you solve correctly is higher than that of the other three participants in your row, you will earn $16.00 for each 
correctly solved problem.  Thus, if your performance is better than the other three participants in your row, your total earnings for this 
round will be:  $16.00 × the number of problems you solve correctly. However, if your performance is ranked second, third, or fourth 
among the participants sitting in your row, you will earn $0 regardless of the number of problems you solve correctly. If there are ties, the 
winner will be determined randomly from among those who are tied for the best performance. 
 
Now please take a minute to make a decision on which compensation method you would like to adopt for Round 1: 
I would like to adopt:  Method A  Method B  (Please circle one). 
 
Compensation Method for Round 2 
Round 2 will last 5 minutes. For this round, Method A will be used for calculating your earnings: 
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Method A: You will earn $4.00 for each problem you solve correctly.  Thus, your total earnings for this round will be:  $4.00 × the number 
of problems solved correctly. 
 
Compensation Method for Round 3 
Round 3 will last 5 minutes. For this round, Method B will be used for calculating your earnings: 
Method B:  Your payment will depend on your performance relative to that of the other three participants who are sitting in your row. If 
the number of problems you solve correctly is higher than that of the other three participants in your row, you will earn $16.00 for each 
correctly solved problem.  Thus, if your performance is better than the other three participants in your row, your total earnings for this 
round will be:  $16.00 × the number of problems you solve correctly. However, if your performance is ranked second, third, or fourth 
among the participants sitting in your row, you will earn $0 regardless of the number of problems you solve correctly. If there are ties, the 
winner will be determined randomly from among those who are tied for the best performance. 
 
Compensation Method for Round 4 
Round 4 will last 5 minutes. For this round, please decide which one of the two following compensation methods you would like to have 
for calculating your earnings: 
Method A: You will earn $4.00 for each problem you solve correctly.  Thus, your total earnings for this round will be:  $4.00 × the number 
of problems solved correctly. 
 
Method B:  Your payment will depend on your performance relative to that of the other three participants who are sitting in your row. If 
the number of problems you solve correctly is higher than that of the other three participants in your row, you will earn $16.00 for each 
correctly solved problem.  Thus, if your performance is better than the other three participants in your row, your total earnings for this 
round will be:  $16.00 × the number of problems you solve correctly. However, if your performance is ranked second, third, or fourth 
among the participants sitting in your row, you will earn $0 regardless of the number of problems you solve correctly. If there are ties, the 
winner will be determined randomly from among those who are tied for the best performance. 
 
Now please take a minute to make a decision on which compensation method you would like to adopt for Round 4. 
I would like to adopt:  Method A  Method B  (Please circle one). 
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Compensation Method for Round 5 
Round 5 will last 5 minutes. For this round, please decide which one of the two following compensation methods you would like to have 
for calculating your earnings: 
Method A: You will earn $4.00 for each problem you solve correctly.  Thus, your total earnings for this round will be:  $4.00 × the number 
of problems solved correctly. 
Method C:  There will be a 25% chance that you will earn $16.00 for each problem you solve correctly. There will be a 75% chance that 
you will earn $0 regardless of the number of problems you solve correctly. We will throw a 4-sided die at the end of the session to 
determine your earnings. If 1 comes up, your total earnings will be:  $16.00 × the number of problems solved correctly. If 2, 3, or 4 comes 
up, your total earnings will be $0. 
Now please take a minute to make a decision on which compensation method you would like to adopt for Round 5: 
I would like to adopt:  Method A  Method C  (Please circle one). 
 
Compensation Method for Round 6 
You do not need to solve problems in this round. Rather, if “Round 6” is randomly selected for payment, your compensation 
depends on the number of correct answers provided in Round 2, in which you were working under Method A ($4 for each 
problem solved correctly).  
Please decide which one of the two following compensation methods you would like to have for calculating your earnings in Round 6: 
Method A: You will earn $4.00 for each problem you solve correctly.  Thus, your total earnings for this round will be:  $4.00 × the number 
of problems solved correctly. 
 
Method B:  Your payment will depend on your performance relative to that of the other three participants who are sitting in your row. If 
the number of problems you solve correctly is higher than that of the other three participants in your row, you will earn $16.00 for each 
correctly solved problem.  Thus, if your performance is better than the other three participants in your row, your total earnings for this 
round will be:  $16.00 × the number of problems you solve correctly. However, if your performance is ranked second, third, or fourth 
among the participants sitting in your row, you will earn $0 regardless of the number of problems you solve correctly. If there are ties, the 
winner will be determined randomly from among those who are tied for the best performance. 
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Now please take a minute to make a decision on which compensation method you would like to adopt for Round 6: 
I would like to adopt:  Method A  Method B  (Please circle one). 
 
Compensation Method for Round 7 
You do not need to perform in this round. Rather, if “Round 7” is randomly selected for payment, your compensation depends on 
the number of correct answers provided in Round 3, in which you were working under Method B. 
Please decide which one of the two following compensation methods you would like to have for calculating your earnings in Round 7: 
Method A: You will earn $4.00 for each problem you solve correctly.  Thus, your total earnings for this round will be:  $4.00 × the number 
of problems solved correctly. 
 
Method B:  Your payment will depend on your performance relative to that of the other three participants who are sitting in your row. If 
the number of problems you solve correctly is higher than that of the other three participants in your row, you will earn $16.00 for each 
correctly solved problem.  Thus, if your performance is better than the other three participants in your row, your total earnings for this 
round will be:  $16.00 × the number of problems you solve correctly. However, if your performance is ranked second, third, or fourth 
among the participants sitting in your row, you will earn $0 regardless of the number of problems you solve correctly. If there are ties, the 
winner will be determined randomly from among those who are tied for the best performance. 
Now please take a minute to make a decision on which compensation method you would like to adopt for Round 7: 
I would like to adopt:  Method A  Method B  (Please circle one). 
